Kierkegaard on Faith, Reason, and Passion by Westphal, Merold
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 8 
1-1-2011 
Kierkegaard on Faith, Reason, and Passion 
Merold Westphal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Westphal, Merold (2011) "Kierkegaard on Faith, Reason, and Passion," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of 
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol28/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 28 No. 1 January 2011 82
All rights reserved
KIERKEGAARD ON FAITH, REASON, AND PASSION
Merold Westphal
Religious faith is often critiqued as irrational either because its beliefs do not 
rise to the level of knowledge as defined by some philosophical theory or be-
cause it rests on emotion rather than knowledge. Or both. Kierkegaard helps 
us to see how these arguments rest on a misunderstanding of all three terms: 
faith, reason, and emotion.
Religious faith is often criticized (patronized, ridiculed, rejected) in the 
name of reason as being irrational, or at least insufficiently rational. Some-
times this is because the beliefs ingredient in faith do not qualify as knowl-
edge in some philosophically defined ideal sense which calls itself reason. 
At other times it is because religion is seen as too much a matter of emo-
tion, of feeling. The two are easily combined: faith is irrational because it 
rests on feeling rather than knowledge.
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard challenges this double critique as a 
misunderstanding of all three elements: faith, reason, and emotion.1
Faith
The first challenge is to what we might call the “Platonic” view of faith, 
the notion that it is the failed attempt to be knowledge in some philosophi-
cally defined ideal sense. Thus, for Plato, true knowledge is to be found in 
mathematics and that moral and metaphysical intuition of the forms that 
is even purer, less discursive, and less tied to images. It is represented by 
the upper “half” of the divided line (episteme, noesis, dianoia) and by the 
world of sunshine outside the dank darkness of the cave. Pistis is the up-
per “half” of the lower “half” of the divided line and occurs in the cave. 
It is normally translated as ‘opinion’ to signify that it falls short of knowl-
edge. At best it may include correct beliefs, but having them is like being a 
blind person who just happens to have found the right road.2
Unfortunately pistis is also the New Testament word for faith, which 
has opened the door in modernity for treating faith as a failed attempt at 
1By ‘Kierkegaard’ I shall mean the actual author who gave us various ideas to think about, 
whether pseudonymously or not. I am honoring his request not to attribute to him the views 
of his pseudonyms, since, in any case, our interest is not in what the historical Kierkegaard 
thought but what we might think. In the present context, recognizing a single source for the 
various pseudonyms is helpful in reading them intertextually.
2Plato, Republic, 506c. It would seem that Plato had been reading Gettier.
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knowledge whose ideal is mathematics, or natural science (mathematical 
physics or evolutionary biology), or some more generic foundationalist 
model, or, in the case of Hegel, an anti-foundationalist, holist account of 
absolute knowing.
For Kierkegaard this is completely to misunderstand the sort of lan-
guage game in which religious faith, at least in its biblical form, occurs. To 
criticize it for not being knowledge in the mode of mathematics, or natural 
science, or speculative metaphysics is like criticizing a football team for 
not serving aces. In response to such a critique, the football players might 
quote one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms: “It is just as you say, and the 
amazing thing is that you think that it is an objection.”3
What, then, is faith for Kierkegaard, and what is the language game to 
which it belongs? Different pseudonyms give us different accounts. Anti-
Climacus describes faith as the opposite of despair and gives the follow-
ing formula for faith: “in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself 
the self rests transparently in the power that established it.”4 For Christian 
faith, which is Kierkegaard’s concern, this power is the Christian God, and 
what is at issue is relational and not epistemic, at least not obviously or 
primarily epistemic. It is a matter of being rightly related to oneself and 
to God. The suggestion is that these two relations are interdependent, but 
there is no suggestion that knowledge in some philosophically ideal sense 
is either necessary or even helpful to such faith.
Johannes Climacus defines truth as subjectivity this way: “An objective 
uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inward-
ness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing individual.” Then 
he adds that “the definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of 
faith. Without risk, no faith. Faith is the contradiction between the infinite 
passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty.”5 We shall return to 
the passionate character of faith.
But let us focus on Fear and Trembling. Although Johannes de Silentio 
doesn’t give us a neat formula, we can easily enough formulate one from 
his retelling of the story of Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis 
3PF, 52. The following sigla will be used for the works of Kierkegaard. All volumes are 
from Kierkegaard’s Writings, published by Princeton University Press and translated by How-
ard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.
CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 1992.
FT Fear and Trembling/Repetition, 1983.
PF Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus, 1985.
SUD The Sickness Unto Death, 1980.
4SUD, 49; cf 14, 30, 82, 131.
5CUP I, 203–204. Some rationalist ideals of what counts as knowledge have certainty built 
in, while empiricist ideals tend to be fallibilist. But for Kierkegaard faith is not just siding 
with empiricist fallibilism, which all too easily can play the Platonic game of assigning faith 
to the cave as either wholly unverifiable/unfalsifiable or not rising to the level of verification 
that scientific knowledge requires. Again the issue is relational, this time the relation of the 
self to its beliefs about God and the world. The emphasis falls on the “how” of believing, not 
on the “what.”
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22. Faith is trusting in the promises of God and obeying the command-
ments of God. The focus, of course, is on Abraham’s obedience, first to 
the command to sacrifice Isaac, and then, at the last minute, to desist. But 
Kierkegaard calls our attention to the fact that Abraham’s obedience is 
grounded in his trust in God’s promises. “By faith Abraham emigrated 
from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the promised land. . . . 
By faith Abraham received the promise that in his seed all the generations 
of the earth would be blessed.”6
The crucial issue is relational. The concern of Abraham’s faith is to be 
and to remain in a right relation with God. There is no question that be-
liefs are involved here.7 For Abraham the crucial belief is that there is a 
God who has given certain promises and commands. But this presuppos-
es that God speaks, which in turn means that this God is truly personal; 
for the ability to perform speech acts would seem to be a necessary condi-
tion, possibly even a sufficient condition, of personhood. We do well to 
remember that for the Abrahamic monotheisms, the emphasis is not only 
on the oneness of God but on the personal character of God; for Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam worship a God who speaks, unless they have sold 
their soul to some extra-scriptural philosophy.8 So the basic belief is not 
trivial, but precisely because of it faith must be understood as an I-Thou 
relation and not a failed attempt at some philosophical ideal of knowl-
edge. It is a subject-subject relation, not a subject-object relation, and it is 
not self-evident that one can rightly trust the promises of God and obey 
the commands of God only if one has based this relation on Knowledge 
as defined by some extra-biblical philosophy.9 That would involve the 
kind of spiritual elitism that Kierkegaard finds so odious in Hegel, who 
holds that philosophy provides the only truly adequate knowledge of 
God and that “Religion is for everyone. It is not philosophy, which is not 
for everyone.”10
6FT, 17.
7In Sickness the most central beliefs are that God (not nature, nor society, at least not ulti-
mately) is the power that has established the self and that God offers forgiveness of sins, the 
various forms of misrelation to God and to self. In short, the beliefs are in God as Creator 
and Redeemer. In Postscript the central belief concerns the Incarnation, that the eternal God 
has become a particular human being and that our relation to God is mediated through this 
divine human being. 
8On God as a performer of speech acts, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philo-
sophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
and my review, “On Reading God the Author,” Religious Studies 37 (2001): 271–291.
9This does not preclude the possibility that the relation is between human communities 
and a personal God. But in Fear and Trembling the emphasis is on the individual so as to 
emphasize that God is the middle term between the individual and both the church and the 
state, and not the other way around. Kierkegaard’s “attack upon Christendom” is already at 
work in Fear and Trembling. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Johannes Climacus bases a 
sustained case for spiritual egalitarianism on the notion that faith does not require the kind 
of knowledge philosophy sometimes requires, eliminating all risk and grounding one’s secu-
rity on one’s own cognitive powers.
10Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. One-Volume Edition. The Lectures of 1827, ed. 
Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 106.
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Of course, one can reflect on the epistemic status of the beliefs ingredi-
ent in faith, but one must remember two things. First, it would be more 
than a little weird to assume that these beliefs can or should have the form 
of our beliefs in mathematics, natural science, or speculative metaphysics. 
Prima facie our knowledge of other human persons would provide the best 
analogy and clue, and it does not have these forms. Second, to engage in 
distanciated reflection is to abstract from the fullness of faith. We need 
to avoid confusing the abstract, doxastic dimension of faith with its core 
concern of being rightly related to a personal God and thereby to oneself. 
The demons have the right, monotheistic metaphysics, we are told (James 
2:19), but they do not have faith.
Reason
Kierkegaard himself engages in such epistemic reflection. In so doing he 
challenges the assumption, typical of enlightened modernity, that reason 
in its autonomy has any rightful hegemony over faith, that the beliefs in-
gredient in faith require certification by reason. We need to be clear here 
about the meaning of our terms. For Kierkegaard, faith is a response to 
revelation, to the speech acts by which one has been addressed by God, 
and reason, in its most general sense, is the activity of human thought 
independent of divine revelation.
Thus, for example, in Philosophical Fragments Johannes Climacus ar-
gues that Christian faith rests on revelation and not on recollection, the 
assumption that unaided human thought has the ability to discover or 
at least to recognize the truth, in this instance about God. In Postscript he 
calls attention to the epistemic and existential risk involved in basing one’s 
life on beliefs that are “objectively uncertain,” incapable of the intuitive or 
discursive infallibility required and often promised by certain philosophi-
cal ideals of knowing. In other words, epistemic reflection calls attention 
to the distinctiveness of the beliefs ingredient in faith and exposes the dog-
matism of the assumption that reason has a rightful hegemony over faith, 
either to dismiss it as irrational or to require it to be reinterpreted by the 
canons of a reason.11 It’s a bit like requiring astronomy and biology to jus-
tify themselves without the benefit of telescopes and microscopes.
The emphasis on the heterogeneity of faith and reason is especially 
strong in Fear and Trembling. In a Kantian tone of voice Kierkegaard de-
scribes human understanding as the “stockbroker of finitude.” But beyond 
Kant, who emphasizes the incapacity of unaided human thought to grasp 
the divine as infinite, unconditioned, and eternal, Kierkegaard emphasizes 
the incompatibility of the worldview of reason with the worldview of faith.12 
11With regard to specific themes of Christian belief, Lessing is an example of the first 
strategy, Kant and Hegel of the second. 
12Thus in Postscript Johannes Climacus insists that Christian faith is not merely beyond 
but more specifically “against the understanding” (CUP I, 565–566). We are dealing with 
what Paul Ricoeur calls a “conflict of interpretations,” a radical conflict because the sources 
and norms of interpretation are different, not just the results. 
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He repeatedly uses three terms to express this conflict. Vis-à-vis reason as 
merely human understanding, faith will necessarily be seen as paradox,13 
as absurd,14 and as madness.15 These are relational, not intrinsic qualities.
There is a double relativity to this “irrationality” which needs emphasis. 
On the one hand, faith is not presented as intrinsically absurd but as bound 
to be seen as such from the standpoint of autonomous reason, which has left 
divine revelation out of account. To dismiss faith as “irrational” because it 
fails to conform to reason is to beg the questions of what ultimately makes 
sense and of what legitimate sources of knowledge are. It is to confuse the 
fact that faith will affirm what reason cannot confirm with the normative 
superiority of reason. As before, faith says to reason, “It is just as you say, 
and the amazing thing is that you think that it is an objection.”16
On the other hand, the paradoxical madness of faith, relative, as just 
noted, to “worldly understanding” and “human calculation,”17 is also rel-
ative to the awesome transcendence of its “object,” the God who speaks on 
God’s own terms. Here Kierkegaard sounds more than a little like Rudolf 
Otto.18 God is the mysterium precisely by being the tremendum.19 Thus faith 
“shudders” and is “shattered” and “repelled” by its encounter with the 
“terror” (“terrible,” “terrifying”), the “horror religiosis,” the “dreadful.”20 
The God of biblical faith is not tame enough to fit without remainder into 
the horizons of the finite world of human speech and thought, the logos in 
terms of which reason defines itself.21
Kierkegaard also challenges modernity’s assumption that reason is 
ahistorically universal. He might have illustrated the historical particular-
ity of “reason” with reference to the project of “religion within the limits 
of reason alone.”22 In the seventeenth century, one of the most powerful 
versions of this project was Spinoza’s; in the eighteenth century, Kant’s; 
and in the nineteenth century, Hegel’s. But the project runs aground here. 
Each of these is fundamentally incompatible with the other two. Reason 
shows itself to be anything but univocal and universal. Lessing’s hope to 
13FT, 33, 48–49, 51–53, 55–56, 62–66, 85, 88.
14FT, 34–37, 40, 46–51, 56, 59.
15FT, 17, 23, 76–77. Silentio calls faith a divine madness, referring to Plato, who speaks of 
“the superiority of heaven-sent madness over man-made sanity” (Phaedrus, 244d).
16PF, 52.
17FT, 17, 36.
18See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1958).
19Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of the saturated phenomenon is also relevant here, with its 
notion of revelation as in excess of our ability to comprehend. See “The Saturated Phenome-
non,” in The Visible and the Revealed, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008); Being Given, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), Book IV; and In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robin 
Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).
20FT, 9, 33, 61, 72, 77–78, 114.
21FT, 46–47.
22This is indeed the name of a project undertaken by many and not just of a book by Kant.
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find a universal religion of reason that would transcend the differences be-
tween Judaism, Christianity, and Islam23 showed itself to be wishful think-
ing when reason’s denominations turned out to be as different from each 
other as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
But Kierkegaard wants to show that the particularity of reason is not 
simply a matter of personal differences but of historical embeddedness. 
Fear and Trembling opens with a reference to “our age,” and through-
out the text with reference to matters aesthetic, ethical, and religious 
Kierkegaard calls attention to prevailing assumptions that differ from 
those of earlier ages. These are not just the superstitions that enlight-
ened reason promises to dispel, but the very beliefs on which it prides 
itself. Thus, for example, while earlier ages thought that faith, like doubt 
and love, were tasks of a lifetime, never fully achieved, the present age 
proudly asserts that it has gone further than faith to the scientific system 
of philosophy.24
In other words, what calls itself reason turns out to be ideology, the 
self-defining and self-legitimizing discourse of a contemporary culture. 
Instead of being universal and necessary, it turns out to be both particular 
and contingent by virtue of the world it both reflects and ratifies. Having 
appeared on the literary scene in 1843, the same year as Marx, Kierkeg-
aard suggests a non-materialist version of ideology critique.25 It deflates 
the proud claims of Reason by showing it to be human, all too human.
An especially important way in which the present age is a particular 
culture rather than universal, pure reason is that it “has crossed out pas-
sion in order to serve science.”26 By science Kierkegaard clearly means 
detached, disinterested objectivity (both as a goal and a putative achieve-
ment). His reference is to the Hegelian system, though in our day reason’s 
challenge to faith is more likely to be made in the name of the natural or 
social sciences than of speculative metaphysics.
Passion
This brings us to our third theme, passion, which links our first two, faith 
and reason. Kierkegaard makes the following claims: that “the essentially 
23In Nathan der Weise.
24FT, 5–7, 121–123. The satire against “going further” runs throughout the text, but in 
these passages it is the bookends between which the entire text is placed. The system in ques-
tion, of course, is the Hegelian system.
25I have developed this theme in Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society (Macon: Mer-
cer University Press, 1987). Paul Ricoeur lists Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the “masters of 
suspicion,” in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 1970), 32. But Kierkegaard is equally a master of the hermeneutics 
of suspicion that detects particular self-interests hiding behind alleged universal objectivity 
and suggests that this hiddenness is not ignorance but self-deception (FT, 121). 
26FT, 7. In this spirit, Charles Taylor writes, “Modern enlightened culture is very theory-
oriented. We tend to live in our heads, trusting our disengaged understandings. . . . We can’t 
accept that part of being good is opening ourselves to certain feelings.” A Secular Age (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 555.
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human is passion,”27 that “faith is a passion,”28 that faith is a “prodigious” 
and “supreme” passion,29 and that “faith is the highest passion in a person.”30 
The emotions he associates most closely with Abraham’s faith are fear, trem-
bling, distress, and anxiety.31 By contrast, reason, in its scientific mode, is the 
attempt to become dispassionate. Like the ancient Stoics, but for different 
reasons, it wants to extirpate passion, to become apathetic, making apatheia 
the horizon of all human life.32
Here Kierkegaard anticipates his sustained contrast in Two Ages (a 
lengthy review of a current novel) between the present age as one of spirit-
less reflection and the revolutionary age as one of passion;33 he complains 
that “what our generation lacks is not reflection but passion.”34 In an ear-
lier draft he complained about his own age “whose insipid rationality has 
pumped all passion out of life.”35
What is of interest to us here is that faith, so far from being inferior to 
reason by virtue of its passionate character, is precisely in this respect su-
perior, more genuinely human. Reason without passion is as incomplete 
as reason without revelation. For religious questions and the closely relat-
ed questions of ethics are about who we are and what we can and should 
do with our lives; and these questions deserve our passionate concern. 
Kierkegaard thinks it a vice, not a virtue, to try to become dispassionate 
about one’s own existence.
Fear and Trembling does not help us very much in seeing how this might 
be true. Kierkegaard does not give us the phenomenology of passion that 
we would like.36 He seems to think we can fill that in for ourselves. As 
27FT, 121.
28FT, 67.
29FT, 23.
30FT, 122.
31In Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard presents faith as the overcoming of various anxiet-
ies that the “heathen” have. The emphasis in Fear and Trembling on God as the Tremendum is 
not the whole story. “Anxiety” is the rendering in the earlier translation of Christian Discours-
es by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). In the later translation by 
the Hongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), it is the “cares” of the pagans from 
which faith is free. But this can be misleading, for faith cares passionately about the relation 
to God.
32See Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 9–10.
33Note the implication that reason is ideology, that the revolutionary conception of reason 
and the contemporary view of reason as systematic, speculative science represent two quite 
different modes of social self-legitimation.
34FT, 42n. In Postscript this becomes the complaint that what the System lacks is not ob-
jectivity but subjectivity, the “infinite, personal, passionate interest” in one’s own existence 
(CUP 1, 29, 33, 55).
35FT, 257. The Preface to Sickness Unto Death contrasts the “earnestness” of the “ethical 
aspect of Christianity” that is concerned with upbuilding with the “scholarly distance” that 
is a “scienticity and scholarliness that is ‘indifferent’” and is “a kind of inhuman curiosity” 
(SUD, 5).
36In addition to faith he identifies, randomly, other sites where passion appears: infinite 
resignation (FT, 42n), the willingness to distinguish, with Socrates, what one knows from 
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we attempt to do so, we can perhaps find some help in the “cognitive-
evaluative” or “cognitive-intentional” understanding of the emotions that 
has gained widespread acceptance in recent philosophical discussion.37 
Although ordinary language doesn’t distinguish between passions, emo-
tions, and feelings, clarity might be served if we do so as follows.
(1) To begin we can say that to have a passion for something is to care 
deeply about it.38 To say of someone that he has a passion for, say, fly fish-
ing, is not merely to say that he enjoys it. We enjoy many things that are 
not important enough to us to generate a passion. To have a passion for fly 
fishing is to care about it so deeply that it becomes part of one’s identity. 
Faith is a passion when we care deeply enough about our God relation 
that it becomes part of our identity; and faith becomes a “supreme” or 
“highest” passion when the God relation is the most important part of our 
identity.
(2) Our next thesis is that a passion is a disposition to have emotions 
such as grief, fear, love, joy, hope, anger, gratitude, hatred, envy, jealousy, 
pity, guilt, compassion, wonder, reverence, awe in the presence of certain 
beliefs.39 Thus if I have a passion for fly fishing I may feel anger if I believe 
someone has stolen my rod and flies; I may feel envy if I believe someone 
has better equipment than mine or has a summer cottage I can’t afford 
near a great stream; and I may feel gratitude if I believe someone has re-
covered the stolen rod and flies or invited me to spend time at that cottage.
(3) In speaking of feeling anger, or envy, or gratitude I have acknowl-
edged that emotions include feelings. The most natural way to speak 
about what anger is is to speak about what it feels like to be angry.40 This 
feeling might be in part a bodily sensation such as a knot in the stomach 
what one doesn’t know (FT, 42n), irony and humor (FT, 51), repentance (FT, 99, 102), and 
love (FT, 121). He links passion with the understanding of faith as the task of a lifetime, al-
ways unfinished (FT, 7, 121–123). He links passion with the leap as opposed to mediation, his 
shorthand, borrowed from Lessing and Hegel, for the realm of objective uncertainty where 
I have to decide what to do or believe without the guarantees that some impersonal reason 
will make my decision for me (FT, 42n). 
37I shall be drawing especially on the “neo-Stoic” view as developed by Martha Nuss-
baum historically in The Therapy of Desire and systematically in Upheavals of Thought: The In-
telligence of the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The quoted phrases 
to describe the theory are from the latter. See also A Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: 
Routledge, 1963); G. Pitcher, “Emotion,” in Mind 74 (1965): 326–346; R. C. Solomon, The Pas-
sions (New York: Doubleday, 1976); and R. C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of 
Christian Virtues (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007) and “Existence, Emotion and Character: 
Classical Themes in Kierkegaard,” in Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Han-
nay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 177–206.
38Harry Frankfurt’s “The Importance of What We Care About” is therefore important for 
any account of faith as a passion. See The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 80–94.
39This list is drawn from Nussbaum, Upheaval, 24, 54, 297ff.
40I’m obviously alluding to Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” in Mortal Ques-
tions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 165–180. Nussbaum argues that we 
cannot assume that there is a single feeling, in this sense, that is uniformly found in each 
emotion.
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or a felt increase in the pulse rate or breathing rate. Thus it can be what 
philosophers sometimes call “raw feels,” like a tickle or an itch or an ache. 
This dimension of emotions can be described as non-cognitive and, in that 
sense, irrational.41
(4) But emotions cannot be reduced to these “kinetic and affective” as-
pects.42 As already indicated, they presuppose two other elements, a car-
ing about something and a believing that something is the case. Only if, 
for example, I care about fly fishing and believe that you have been helpful 
to me (in this regard) will I feel gratitude toward you (in this regard).43
(5) Emotions, then, can be seen as complex wholes with three distinct 
aspects: caring, believing, and feeling.44 The feeling component may be 
non-cognitive, but the emotion as a whole is not. It can be described as 
“rational,” an exercise of human reason, in three ways. First, it is inten-
tional. It is about something or someone in a way that “raw feels” are not. 
I am angry at him, grateful to her, and so forth. Second, it has the form of 
a judgment, an evaluative judgment. It is a seeing as, a construal, an inter-
pretation of something or someone with respect to what concerns me or 
what I care about. Third, because of its link to factual beliefs, it is subject 
to rational critique and, at least to some degree, to rational modification. 
If I am reminded that I lent my fishing equipment to my cousin and he 
did not steal it, my anger will be assuaged (unless it has some deeper, hid-
den motivating belief). In this sense emotions can be shown to be justified 
or unjustified.
(6) There is another sense in which the complex whole that is an emo-
tion can be subject to rational evaluation, though this is likely to be more 
problematic. Whether or not my emotion is justified depends in part on 
whether the factual beliefs ingredient in it are true. But it also depends on 
41C. Stephen Evans points out that feelings in this sense are not what Kierkegaard means 
by passion and that a person whose life is governed by such “momentary feelings” or “in-
voluntary urges” is pretty much what Frankfurt (see note 38) calls a “wanton.” Kierkegaard: 
An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 21–22. Frankfurt’s notion of 
a wanton and Kierkegaard’s notion of the aesthetic stage or sphere of existence are at least 
first cousins.
42Nussbaum, Upheaval, 44.
43Frankfurt calls attention to the fact that sometimes we care about things because we 
believe they are important (as opposed to their becoming important because we care about 
them, like fly fishing), and Nussbaum notes that these beliefs can be culture-relative. Frank-
furt, Importance, 92–93 and Nussbaum, Therapy, 38–39. 
44I am deliberately speaking rather loosely, not trying to settle debates that do not di-
rectly concern my argument. Thus, Nussbaum raises the question whether the beliefs are 
constituent parts, necessary conditions, or sufficient conditions of emotions. They can hardly 
be sufficient conditions, since lacking the caring element the beliefs would not give rise to 
emotions. Rather than choose between the other options, I am content to say with her, rather 
vaguely, “Emotions . . . involve judgments [or beliefs] about important things.” Upheaval, 19, 
34. Nor am I trying to settle the debate over whether we should speak of beliefs or belief-like 
states that involve construals on the ground that the former are involuntary and the latter 
somewhat voluntary. I am inclined to see all beliefs as construals, most of which, if not all, 
are a messy mix of voluntary and involuntary. See Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in 
Aid of Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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whether what I care about, and in the case of a passion, what I care about 
so deeply that it becomes part of my identity, is worth caring about.45
Some things are worth caring about because they provide a pleasure 
sufficiently free from negative factors (for me or for others, including the 
environment) that cancel out this good. In a eudaimonistic framework, 
Nussbaum sees things as worth caring about in terms of their contribu-
tion to our flourishing, which, in an Aristotelian manner, is not equated 
with pleasure. In either case, what is worthwhile may be person-relative 
or culture-relative. But in the latter case there may be aspects of human 
flourishing distinctive of the human as such and thus worth caring about 
for everyone (as fly fishing obviously is not).
Biblical religion makes such a claim for the God relation. Whether 
such a claim is justified depends on whether there is a God, what this 
God may be like, and who we are. Such metaphysical matters are con-
troversial and open to debate. But just as it would be sheer dogmatism 
to assume that reason, in the sense of human thought without the ben-
efit of divine revelation, has an a priori privilege over faith, in the sense 
of human thought informed by divine revelation, so it would be ques-
tion-begging to discredit faith because it is a passion that gives rise to a 
rich and complex emotional life before God, including fear, guilt, grief 
(sorrow for sin), love, joy, gratitude, compassion, wonder, reverence, 
and awe. For if the biblical picture of God is right, such emotions are 
in principle well justified value judgments and fundamental to human 
flourishing.
The opponent might respond that it is all right for well founded be-
liefs to give rise to emotions; the problem is that in religion it is emo-
tions that give rise to beliefs, and this is irrational. Here we meet Plato 
again and his fear that the “lower” parts of the soul (appetitive and 
spirited) will rule the “higher” part. But this seems to presuppose that 
emotions are merely affective, feelings in the sense of raw feels. If, how-
ever, emotions are complexly cognitive, they may be well founded judg-
ments, and there is no obvious reason why they should not play a role 
in the life of belief. The task is to sort out the good ones from the bad 
ones. The fact that this is no easy task is no good reason to dismiss the 
emotions wholesale.
That our emotions and the passions that give rise to them are neither 
good nor bad per se is Aristotelian. Thus, for example, the rational task is 
to learn how to be angry “with the right person, to the right extent, at the 
right time, for the right reason, and in the right way.” This is not easy, 
but it is “rare, praiseworthy, and noble.”46 It is within this horizon that 
Roberts can point out that some virtues, like compassion and gratitude, 
45Unless I am a positivist, I will not think that my judgments about what is worth caring 
about are themselves merely expressions of emotions.
46Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a, 27–29.
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are dispositions to the emotions whose name they bear,47 and Nussbaum 
can argue that emotions have a proper role to play in moral reasoning.48
Kierkegaard seems to presuppose something like this analysis of our 
affective life and to extend it from the moral to the religious life. Religious 
life has gone astray, to be sure, when it rests on bad emotions or nourishes 
them. But this is just as true of secular life, and the politics of resentment, 
for example, is not an aid to personal flourishing or to the common pur-
suit of the common good. In neither case is the problem with emotion and 
passion as such.
So, in sum, Kierkegaard argues that when we pay sufficient attention 
to what faith, and reason, and emotion really are, we will not be in a po-
sition to say that faith is irrational because it rests on feeling rather than 
knowledge.
Fordham University
47Roberts, Spiritual Emotions, especially chapter 2.
48Nussbaum, Upheavals, 3.
